Simulation of Liquid Rocket Engine Failure Propagation Using Self-Evolving Scenarios by Motiwala, Samira & Mathias, Donovan
Simulation of Liquid Rocket Engine Failure Propagation Using Self-
Evolving Scenarios 
Donovan Mathias, NASA Ames Research Center 
Samira Motiwala, University Space Research Association, NASA Ames Research Center  
Key Words: spaceflight, rocket engine, dynamic risk assessment, scenario generation  
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional probabilistic risk assessment approaches often 
require failure scenarios to be explicitly defined through event 
sequences that are then quantified as part of the integrated 
analysis. This approach becomes difficult when failure 
propagation paths change as a function of the system 
operation. Additionally, if the propagation paths represent 
interactions among even a modest number of components, the 
scenario count becomes combinatorially intractable. This 
paper presents an alternate approach for quantifying the 
probability of failure propagation in such a case. Rather than 
explicitly defining scenario sequences, simple physical models 
are created for each of the components. In this way, only the 
physical states and rules of component interactions must be 
defined, rather than event sequences for each individual 
scenario. Initiating failures are introducted into the system, 
either randomly or as defined by relative likelihood, and the 
failures cascade through the system via the interaction rules. 
This process is repeated using Monte Carlo methods and, as a 
result, the most probable scenarios “self-evolve” in terms of 
both sequence path and frequency. 
This approach was applied to failures occurring in the 
engine compartment of a space launch vehicle with four liquid 
rocket engines and four high-pressure helium tanks. Each 
engine was modeled with key components, such as 
turbomachinery, combustion chamber, propellant lines, and 
additional support systems. Three test cases were conducted 
with different high-energy engine failures. End results of 
interest included an additional engine-out failure and tank 
burst, which represent the loss-of-mission (LOM) and loss-of-
crew (LOC) failure environments, respectively. Observations 
show that almost every scenario outcome is unique and that 
many scenarios involve complex chain reactions that are 
difficult to predict. This validates the usefulness of the 
modeling approach in assessing the overall risks to the crew 
during a launch vehicle abort.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) strives to achieve and maintain high safety standards 
for its space launch and exploration systems. Probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) is incorporated into the development and 
operation of these complex systems to identify driving risk 
factors and strategies for cost-effectively improving their 
safety and performance. Crew safety remains NASA’s 
primary goal for human spaceflight missions, and effective 
abort capabilities are crucial for reducing the overall risk to 
the crew.  
The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at the 
NASA Ames Research Center provides simulation-based risk 
assessment approaches for analyzing crew launch vehicle 
abort scenarios during the mission ascent phase. The ERA 
approaches use physics-based models to characterize failure 
environments in terms of risks posed by blast overpressure, 
resulting debris field, and fireball thermal radiation [1]. The 
subsequent propagation of these failure environments is 
analyzed to evaluate the abort system’s ability to escape 
safely. Failure propagation analysis involves assessing various 
failure “initiators” and quantifying their relationship with 
crew-threatening failure environments. The ultimate goal is to 
identify driving risk factors and guide designers towards 
effective risk-reducing strategies [2].  
Current PRA approaches can pose challenges, however, 
since they require the explicit definition of failure scenarios 
through event sequences that are then quantified and 
integrated into the overall analysis. A list of failure initiators is 
generated to identify all critical functions required for a 
successful mission ascent, and each initiator can propagate its 
failure in multiple ways. Therefore, all possible propagation 
paths from every possible initiator need to be considered for a 
comprehensive analysis of all involved risks. This approach 
becomes difficult when these propagation paths change as a 
function of the system operation or when the scenario count 
becomes unmanageable.  
This paper presents an alternate approach for quantifying 
failure propagation probabilities to generate scenarios more 
organically and intuitively. Rather than explicitly defining 
scenario sequences, simple physical models of the components 
are created to generate self-evolving scenarios from a given 
failure initiator. Each component is described by its ability to 
generate physical threats to its peers as well as its 
susceptibility to state disturbances caused by other 
components. Each component monitors the integrated system 
state for changes that impact its own operation. In this way, 
only the rules of component interactions must be defined, 
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rather than each individual scenario’s event sequence. These 
interaction rules can vary as a function of the system state 
itself to more accurately represent the evolution of failure. 
Initiating failures are injected into the system, either randomly 
or as defined by relative likelihood, and the failures cascade 
through the system via the interaction rules. This process is 
repeated using Monte Carlo methods and, as a result, the most 
probable scenarios “self-evolve” in terms of both sequence 
path and frequency. 
This paper outlines how this approach can be used to 
simulate failure propagation from blast wave and debris field 
environments. The physics of the model is explained as well 
as the specific pre-defined states and interaction rules required 
to run the simulation. The paper concludes with an example of 
the approach applied to failures occurring in the engine 
compartment of a space launch vehicle. In this example, four 
liquid rocket engines are modeled and tested with various 
high-energy component initiators that are capable of creating 
explosive failure environments. Observations from this test 
case are used to assess and cross-validate existing data to 
better understand the interrelationships between components 
and their surrounding environment, with the ultimate goal of 
improving the safety of crew launch systems.   
2 MODELING APPROACH 
The Monte Carlo framework begins with explicit 
definitions of each component’s physical states and interaction 
rules. Each component is physically modeled using CAD 
software, and the geometry is included in the simulation using 
a triangulated surface mesh. The initial conditions assigned to 
a component—such as the number, speeds, and directions of 
fragments released—are characterized by uncertainty 
distributions so that every failure scenario is effectively 
unique. Physical properties assigned to each component 
vessel, such as the amount of its pressurization, help 
characterize its system state. Each component also has 
vulnerability criteria that describe its own response to blast 
pressures and debris impacts. 
This section outlines the debris and blast wave 
propagation models. It describes the initial states and 
conditions defined for each model as well as the physical 
mechanisms involved during the propagation.  
2.1 Debris Propagation 
The debris field environment is strongly dependent on the 
initial fragment distribution, which is defined in terms of the 
total number of debris pieces as well as each piece’s mass and 
imparted relative velocity [1]. Masses are assigned by 
specifying a component’s total mass and a distribution type to 
allocate a mass value for each debris piece. Velocities are 
assigned by specifying values and distribution types for the 
speed and distribution angles of each debris piece. A kinetic 
energy vulnerability criterion is included to describe a 
component’s structural threshold for withstanding an impact.   
To initiate the propagation sequence, the user selects the 
component that serves as the source of the propagation (i.e., 
the component that fragments and generates a debris cloud). 
The initiator’s debris catalog is randomly generated based on 
the aforementioned inputs. These debris pieces are treated as 
point masses that emanate from the source’s geometric center 
with masses and velocities defined from the catalog.  
The model calculates a debris strike by determining if the 
velocity ray of each debris piece intersects each surface mesh 
triangle of every surrounding component. However, before 
determining whether the velocity ray intersects the individual 
triangles of a component’s surface mesh, a triangulated 
“bounding box” is created to first compute whether the ray 
passes through the vicinity of any given component. This box 
uses the component’s minimum and maximum coordinate 
values to determine the minimum enclosing box within which 
all of the component’s vertices lie. Each surface of the box is 
divided into two triangles for a total of 12 triangles (the 
minimum amount of triangles required for the box’s 
triangulated mesh). This enables the model to save a 
significant amount of computation time since a component can 
have hundreds to thousands of triangles comprising its mesh. 
Figure 1 shows a visual representation of a meshed object 
surrounded by a meshed bounding box. 
 
Figure 1 – Triangulated Sphere with Meshed Bounding 
Box 
 
The inclusion of a point on the ray with a triangular plane 
can be determined by computing the parametric coordinates of 
the intersection point in the plane [3-4]. Consider a ray from v1 
to v2 (with v = v2 - v1) and a triangle with vertices p1, p2, and 
p3. The normal of the plane containing the triangle is 
computed using the cross product: 
n = (p2 – p1) x (p3 – p1)   (1) 
 
If the ray intersects the plane, then the point of 
intersection can be evaluated to determine if that point also 
intersects the triangle. Otherwise, if the ray does not intersect 
the plane, then no intersections with the triangle are possible. 
The parametric representation of the ray is given by: 
 
x = o + s v    (2) 
 
where o is the origin of the ray, v is the ray direction vector, 
and s is the “slope-like” parameter corresponding to the 
intersection point. This parameter can be determined by first 
considering the implicit representation of the plane: 
 
n ⋅ x + (–p1 ⋅ n) = 0   (3) 
 
 
Substituting (2) into (3), rearranging terms, and solving 
for s gives: 
s = – n ⋅ (o – p1) / (n ⋅ v)  (4) 
 
If the denominator of s is less than a very small number 
(close to zero), the ray is considered parallel to the triangular 
plane and no intersection occurs. If s = 0 (i.e., the dot product 
in the numerator is zero), the ray lies in the triangular plane 
and again, no intersection occurs. There is also no intersection 
if s < 0 (ray points away from the triangular plane) or if s > 1. 
Otherwise, Equation (2) computes the intersection point of the 
ray with the plane.  
Once the intersection with the plane is confirmed, the 
inclusion of that point in the triangle itself must be validated. 
This can be done by first computing the area of the triangle in 
3D space and then computing the triangular areas formed by 
the intersection point with each of the triangle’s edges. If the 
difference between the triangular area and the sum of the other 
areas is zero (or less than a very small tolerance), then the 
areas are equivalent and the ray intersects the triangle. 
Otherwise, the ray only intersects the plane and not the 
triangle.  
If the model results indicate an intersection of the velocity 
ray with any of the bounding box’s triangles, every triangle of 
the component’s meshed surface is searched to determine 
whether the velocity ray intersects the component. If the 
model confirms an intersection with any of the component’s 
surface triangles, it calculates the strike time using the debris 
piece’s travelled distance and speed. Since the ray would 
intersect the component twice (to get both “inside” and back 
“outside”), only the first strike, corresponding to the earlier 
strike time, is stored and tabulated.  
The debris piece imparts a kinetic energy to the 
component it strikes, so a kinetic energy threshold is specified 
as an input for each component to establish the maximum 
energy impact it can withstand before failing. If the imparted 
energy exceeds this threshold, and if the component is 
breakable (i.e., it can generate debris), then the component 
serves as the new “source” of debris for propagation. Its debris 
catalog is generated and the model computes whether the new 
debris pieces intersect any other components. Those that have 
already generated debris for propagation (i.e., “exploded”) 
become nonexistent and are reduced to a single point so that 
they cannot be “struck” by subsequent propagations. The 
process repeats itself until no remaining components are 
struck or all further propagation possibilities are exhausted.  
 
2.2 Blast Wave Propagation 
Blast overpressure is the pressure caused by a shock wave 
due to a high-energy explosion or tank burst. The intensity of 
the overpressure environment is typically measured in terms 
of the peak overpressure value and the time integration of the 
overpressure distribution (i.e., impulse) [2].  
The blast propagation model is based on the Kingery-
Bulmash (K-B) equations [5] used to model a spherical, 
surface explosion. This model uses K-B curve fitting for high-
explosive blast propagation characteristics based on 1 kg of 
TNT at sea level. It generates blast environment parameters 
from component vessel parameters, ambient environment 
parameters, and distance from the vessel to a target 
component. The outputs of the model include incident and 
reflected peak overpressure as well as incident and reflected 
impulse.  
The component vessel state parameters include its 
volume, pressure, and specific heat ratio of contained gas. 
Ambient environment parameters, such as pressure, specific 
heat ratio, and speed of sound, also govern the shock 
propagation. These are determined from a given altitude, 
which the user specifies as part of the failure initiation. After 
subsequent propagations, however, the altitude changes based 
on the elapsed time. The new altitude can be determined from 
an altitude-time history curve, which is typically obtained 
from a trajectory analysis of the given launch vehicle 
platform. 
Similar to the kinetic energy threshold, an overpressure 
threshold is pre-defined for each component to establish the 
maximum peak reflected overpressure it can withstand before 
failing and becoming a new source of both debris and blast 
overpressure. The reflected peak overpressure is used because 
it is the maximum amount of overpressure experienced by the 
impacted component. Any failed element, either by debris 
strike or blast overpressure, becomes nonexistent for 
subsequent propagations.  
 
2.3 Model Results 
Using the modeling approach described above, the user 
needs only to specify the failure initiator to begin the 
propagation simulation, which continues until the system has 
catastrophically failed or the failure propagation ends. In this 
way, the chain-reaction scenarios manifest themselves (“self-
evolve”) based on the initiator alone. It is clear to see that 
increasing the number of modeled components increases the 
number of possible permutations (and other sequence paths) 
resulting from a single initiator. Eventually, with a large 
enough number of components, the scenario count becomes 
combinatorially intractable. This approach allows for a large 
increase in modeled components for only a modest increase in 
computation time because the most probable scenarios 
naturally evolve.  
The end result of the Monte Carlo simulation for a given 
initiator is the frequency of component failures of interest and 
associated sequence of events. The model records the 
probabilities of each component’s observed failure 
occurrences as well as the probability breakdown of each 
victim component’s failure from all contributing culprit 
components. The model also tracks every failure sequence to 
determine the probability of any particular sequence occurring 
and identify the most likely sequence of events. This enables 
the user to estimate the scenario likelihoods, which can be 
used to make informative risk assessment decisions. 
 
3 LIQUID ROCKET ENGINE EXAMPLE 
The failure propagation approach is applied to an 
assembly of liquid-fuelled cryogenic rocket engines in the 
engine bay of a generic space launch vehicle. The components 
are created using computer-aided design (CAD) software and 
are roughly based on a highly simplified version of Aerojet 
Rocketdyne’s J2X, a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine 
originally planned for use on NASA’s Ares I launch vehicle 
[6]. Critical high-energy components of the engine include the 
main combustion chamber (MCC), hydrogen fuel turbopump 
(FTP), oxygen turbopump (OTP), and gas generator (GG).  
The end results of interest include the failure propagation 
paths that lead to either a loss-of-mission (LOM) or loss-of-
crew (LOC) outcome. Since a launch vehicle design may 
allow for one engine out (i.e., one engine can “fail” or shut 
down), a second engine out would compromise the mission 
and prompt an abort, causing a LOM. A second engine out 
would occur if the propagation path from a failure initiator 
eventually reached a critical component of another engine and 
caused it to fail. A high-pressure helium tank burst could 
cause a catastrophic failure to the vehicle stage. The severity 
of such a failure is dependent on many factors, but for this 
analysis high-pressure tank burst is assumed to lead to LOC. 
 
Figure 2 – Simplified Engine Mesh Model  
 
The 3D engine CAD geometry is imported into 
NASTRAN, a finite element analysis tool that generates a 
surface mesh of the object with defined vertices, faces, and 
surface normals. This information is then imported into the 
failure propagation model. Figure 2 shows the simplified mesh 
model consisting of the MCC, FTP, OTP, fuel and hot gas 
pipes, and nozzle.  
The engine bay assembly consists of four engines and 
four high-pressure helium tanks. Figure 3 shows a 
representation of the generic launch vehicle engine bay 
configuration. The engines are positioned in a circular 
arrangement and the helium tanks are positioned between two 
adjacent engines at a distance above them. Each engine is 
rotated 90 degrees with respect to adjacent engines for 
rotational symmetry. The engine was sized to fit the engine 
bay, each with a length of about 1.44 meters and maximum 
diameter of about 1.3 meters. Each tank has a length of about 
0.76 meters and maximum diameter of about 0.42 meters. 
There are 28 components in total: 6 components per engine 
and one component for each tank. Table 1 summarizes the 
number of surface triangles for each component type. 
 
Figure 3 – Engine Bay Configuration: Top View (Left) and 
Side View (Right) 
 
Table 1 – Component Surface Triangle Count 
 
3.1 Test Case Inputs 
Tables 2a and 2b summarize the debris and blast 
propagation model inputs, respectively. The MCC and tanks 
are given a range for the number of debris pieces generated for 
each Monte Carlo trial, a velocity magnitude of 300 m/s for 
each debris piece, and uniform distributions for each angle of 
spread. The turbopumps, however, do not come fully apart and 
are therefore assigned a fixed number of blades (as debris 
pieces) that propagate at a much higher speed of 1,000 m/s. 
Their distribution is uniform circumferentially with respect to 
the spin axis and normal around the spin axis normal. The rest 
of the components (both pipes and nozzle) are treated as static 
elements—they are allowed to be struck but do not generate 
any debris fields themselves. The pipes can fail in the sense 
that a leakage can occur if struck with enough energy or 
pressure, but the nozzle is assumed to not fail since the 
majority of the component does not have any pressurized 
liquids or gasses flowing through it. All defined values are 
conservative and every debris strike is treated as a failure. 
Blast model inputs also only consider components that 
can physically break. The MCC and tanks are the only 
pressurized components. The tanks are highly pressurized and 
have a much lower overpressure threshold than the MCC and 
turbopumps.  
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3.2 Test Case Results 
Three test case scenarios were considered: source failures 
from the MCC, FTP, and OTP. Only one engine was tested 
since it was assumed that the rotational symmetry would yield 
similar results for the other engines, whose inputs are all 
identical. Each test case simulation was comprised of 1,000 
Monte Carlo trials at a 10-kilometer altitude (arbitrarily 
chosen). Probabilities of resulting debris strikes for every case 
were intuitive: components closer to the initiating failure 
source were struck more often than those further away. 
Additionally, strike probabilities from the FTP initiator were 
higher overall, which is also intuitive considering it is closer in 
proximity to surrounding components than the MCC or OTP. 
Table 3 summarizes the engine out and tank burst failure 
probabilities from each simulation. As mentioned, every strike 
is conservatively considered to cause a failure, so the 
probabilities are highly exaggerated. No failures due to blast 
wave propagation were observed. 
 
Table 3 – Engine Out and Tank Burst Probabilities for 
Each Initiator 
 
An interesting observation from the stored sequence data 
for each test case is the uniqueness of the specific chain of 
failure propagation events. In the first case where the MCC is 
the initiator, about 76% of the Monte Carlo trials resulted in a 
unique sequence of events (i.e., had a probability of 1E-3).  Of 
the 24% that experienced recurring sequences, the most 
probable outcomes included no strikes from the initiator 
(5.7%) and the initiator only striking its own nozzle (4.6%). 
The remaining sequence outcomes, with probabilities less than 
2% each, did not involve strikes to any other engine 
component (i.e., no chain reaction). 
For the OTP initiator, about 67% of the sequences were 
unique. Of the 33% that experienced recurring sequences, the 
most probable outcome was the initiator striking its own 
engine’s larger pipe (5.8%). The remaining sequence 
outcomes, with probabilities less than 3% each, did not 
involve strikes to any other engine component. For the FTP 
initiator, almost 90% of the Monte Carlo trials resulted in a 
unique sequence of events. The highest recurring sequence of 
the remaining 10% was the initiator striking its own MCC and 
smaller pipe (1.3%) and the initiator striking just the smaller 
pipe (1%). The remaining recurring sequence outcomes had 
probabilities of less than 1% each and did not involve strikes 
to other engine components. 
The unpredictability of these self-evolving scenarios 
shows how pre-defining a list of propagation paths can miss a 
significant amount of the involved risk. Many of the critical 
LOM and LOC outcomes do not manifest from a direct strike 
by the initiator, but rather through a series of complicated 
chain reactions that cannot be predicted by intuition alone. 
This fact validates the use of the described modeling 
approach, which can be instrumental in assessing and 
mitigating risks to crew systems during a launch vehicle abort.  
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